

Extracting the collective wisdom in probabilistic judgments[‡]

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Abstract

How should we combine disagreeing expert judgments on the likelihood of an event? A common solution is simple averaging, which allows independent individual errors to cancel out. However, judgments can be correlated due to an overlap in their information, resulting in a miscalibration in the simple average. Optimal weights for weighted averaging are typically unknown and require past data to estimate reliably. This paper proposes an algorithm to aggregate probabilistic judgments under shared information. Experts are asked to report a prediction and a meta-prediction. The latter is an estimate of the average of other individuals' predictions. In a Bayesian setup, I show that if average prediction is a consistent estimator, the percentage of predictions and meta-predictions that exceed the average prediction should be the same. An “overshoot surprise” occurs when the two measures differ. The Surprising Overshoot algorithm uses the information revealed in an overshoot surprise to correct for miscalibration in the average prediction. Experimental evidence suggests that the algorithm performs well in moderate to large samples and in aggregation problems where individuals disagree in their predictions.

Keywords— Wisdom of Crowds, Judgment Aggregation, Forecasting, Shared Information

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1 Introduction

Decision making is often a problem of assessing the chances of uncertain events. Scientists make probabilistic projections on natural phenomena, such as the occurrence of a major earthquake or the effects of anthropogenic climate change. Strategists assess the likelihood of important geopolitical events. Investors form judgments on the risks involved in investments. Economists and policy makers need probabilistic predictions on policy outcomes and macroeconomic indicators. Individual judgments may be subject to biases such as optimism, overconfidence, anchoring on an initial estimate, focusing too much on easily available information, neglecting an event’s base rate, and many more (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982). Combining multiple judgments to leverage ‘the wisdom of crowds’ is known to be an effective approach in improving accuracy (Surowiecki, 2004; Makridakis and Winkler, 1983).

The use of collective wisdom involves choosing an aggregation method that combines individual predictions into an aggregate prediction (Armstrong, 2001; Clemen, 1989; Palan et al., 2019). Previous work found simple averaging to be surprisingly effective, typically outperforming more sophisticated aggregation methods and showing robustness across various settings (Makridakis and Winkler, 1983; Mannes et al., 2012; Winkler et al., 2019; Genre et al., 2013). Intuitively, simple averaging allows statistically independent individual errors to cancel, leading to a more accurate prediction (Larrick and Soll, 2006). However, in some prediction tasks, forecasters may have common information through shared expertise, past realizations, knowledge of the same academic works, etc. (Chen et al., 2004). Then, individual errors may become correlated, resulting in a bias in the equally weighted average of predictions (Palley and Soll, 2019). In theory, the decision maker in a given task can select and weight judgments such that the errors perfectly cancel out (Clemen and Winkler, 1986; Mannes et al., 2014; Budescu and Chen, 2015). However, optimal weights depend on how experts’ prediction errors are correlated and are typically unknown to the decision maker. Some existing methods aim to estimate appropriate weights using past data from similar

28 tasks (Budescu and Chen, 2015; Mannes et al., 2014). The effectiveness of this approach
29 is limited by the availability and reliability of past data. Another line of work proposed
30 competitive elicitation mechanisms (Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2006; Lichtendahl Jr and Win-
31 kler, 2007), which may improve the calibration of the average forecast when forecasters have
32 common information (Lichtendahl Jr et al., 2013; Pfeifer et al., 2014; Pfeifer, 2016). Such
33 competitive mechanisms are sensitive to strategic considerations of forecasters (Peeters et al.,
34 2021).

35 This paper develops the Surprising Overshoot (SO) algorithm to aggregate judgments on
36 the likelihood of an event. I consider a setup where experts form their judgments by combin-
37 ing shared and private information on an unknown probability. When shared information
38 differs from the true probability, experts are likely to err in the same direction, resulting
39 in a miscalibrated average prediction. The SO algorithm relies on an augmented elicitation
40 proposed in recent work (Prelec, 2004; Prelec et al., 2017; Palley and Soll, 2019; Palley and
41 Satopää, 2022; Wilkening et al., 2021): Experts report a prediction of the probability as well
42 as an estimate of the average of others’ predictions, which is referred to as a meta-prediction.
43 I show that when the average prediction is a consistent estimator, the percentage of predic-
44 tions and meta-predictions that overshoot the average prediction should be the same. An
45 *overshoot surprise* occurs when the two measures differ, which indicates that the average
46 prediction is an inconsistent estimator. The SO estimator uses the information in the size
47 and direction of the overshoot surprise to account for the shared-information problem. It
48 does not require the use of past data.

49 I test the SO algorithm using experimental data from two sources. Palley and Soll (2019)
50 conducted an experimental study where subjects are asked to predict the number of heads
51 in 100 flips of a biased coin. Their experiment implements shared and private signals as
52 sample flips from the biased coin. The second source is Wilkening et al. (2021), who con-
53 ducted two experimental studies. The first experiment replicates the earlier study by Prelec
54 et al. (2017) which asked subjects true/false questions about the capital cities of U.S. states.

55 However, unlike Prelec et al. (2017) they also ask subjects to report probabilistic predictions
56 and meta-predictions, which allows an implementation of the SO algorithm. In the second
57 experiment, Wilkening et al. (2021) generate 500 basic science statements and ask subjects
58 to report probabilistic predictions and meta-predictions on the likelihood that a given state-
59 ment is true. Results suggest that the SO algorithm outperforms simple benchmarks such as
60 unweighted averaging and median prediction. I also compare the SO algorithm to alterna-
61 tive solutions for aggregating probabilistic judgments, which elicit similar information from
62 individuals (Palley and Soll, 2019; Martinie et al., 2020; Palley and Satopää, 2022; Wilkening
63 et al., 2021). The SO algorithm compares favorably to alternative aggregation mechanisms
64 in prediction tasks where individual predictions are highly dispersed. Experimental evidence
65 suggests that the SO algorithm is especially effective in extracting the collective wisdom
66 from strongly disagreeing probabilistic judgments in moderate to large samples of experts.

67 This paper contributes to the literature of judgment aggregation mechanisms that utilize
68 meta-beliefs to improve prediction accuracy. The Surprisingly Popular (SP) algorithm picks
69 an answer to a multiple choice question based on predicted and realized endorsement rates
70 of alternative choices (Prelec et al., 2017). The Surprisingly Confident (SC) algorithm de-
71 termines weights that leverage more informed judgments (Wilkening et al., 2021). The SP
72 and SC algorithms aim to find the correct answer to a binary or multiple-choice question
73 while the SO algorithm produces a probabilistic estimate on a binary event.

74 Recent work developed aggregation algorithms for probabilistic judgments as well. Pivot-
75 ing uses meta-predictions to recover and recombine shared and private information optimally
76 (Palley and Soll, 2019). Knowledge-weighting constructs a weighted average such that the
77 accuracy of weighted crowd’s aggregate meta-prediction is maximized (Palley and Satopää,
78 2022). Meta-probability weighting also attaches weights to individual predictions where the
79 absolute difference between an individual’s prediction and meta-prediction is considered as
80 an indicator of expertise (Martinie et al., 2020). In testing the performance of the SO al-
81 gorithm, pivoting, knowledge-weighting and meta-probability weighting are considered as

82 benchmarks. As mentioned above, the SO algorithm performs especially well when individ-
83 ual judgments are highly dispersed. In practice, such problems are likely to be the most
84 challenging ones, where expert judgments disagree substantially and it is not clear how
85 judgments should be aggregated for maximum accuracy.

86 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the formal framework.
87 Section 3 develops the SO algorithm and establishes the theoretical properties of the SO
88 estimator. Section 4 introduces the data sets and benchmarks we consider in testing the
89 SO algorithm empirically. The same section also presents some preliminary evidence on
90 how overshoot surprises relate to the inaccuracy in average prediction. Section 5 presents
91 experimental evidence testing the SO algorithm. Section 6 provides a discussion on the
92 effectiveness of the SO algorithm. Section 7 concludes.

93 2 The Framework

94 The formal framework follows the definition of a *linear aggregation problem* in Palley and
95 Soll (2019) and Palley and Satopää (2022) with the quantity of interest being a probability.
96 The notation will also be similar to Palley and Soll (2019). Let $Y \in \{0, 1\}$ be a random
97 variable that represents the occurrence of an event where $y \in \{0, 1\}$ denotes the value in
98 a given realization. Also let $\theta = P(Y = 1)$ be the unknown objective probability of the
99 outcome 1, representing the occurrence of the event. A decision maker (DM) would like to
100 estimate θ . The DM elicits judgments from a sample of $N \geq 2$ risk-neutral agents to develop
101 an estimator, where $N \rightarrow \infty$ represents the whole population.

102 Agents share a common prior belief over θ where μ_0 represents the common prior ex-
103 pectation. All agents observe a common signal, given by the average of m_1 independent
104 realizations of Y . A subset $K \leq N$ of agents are *experts* who receive an additional inde-
105 pendent signal. Without loss of generality, let agents $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, K\}$ be the experts. An
106 expert's *private signal* t_i is the average of ℓ agent-specific independent realizations of Y . In

107 the analysis below, we consider the case where $K = N$, i.e. all agents are experts who ob-
 108 serve a private signal as well as the common signal. Appendix B presents the same analysis
 109 for the case of $K < N$ and shows that the same results are applicable.

Let μ_0 represent m_0 independent observations of Y . Also let $m \equiv m_0 + m_1$ and $s \equiv (m_0\mu_0 + m_1s_1)/m$. The *shared signal* s represents a combination of the prior expectation and the common signal. Each agent i follows a belief updating according to Bayes' rule. Posterior expectation $E[\theta|s, t_i]$ is given by

$$E[\theta|s, t_i] = (1 - \omega)s + \omega t_i \tag{1}$$

110 where $\omega = \ell/(m + \ell)$ denotes the Bayesian weight that represents the informativeness of the
 111 private signal t_i relative to the shared signal s ¹. The signal structure and $\{m, \ell\}$ are common
 112 knowledge to all agents. Agents know that the posterior expectation of any agent i with
 113 private signal t_i is given by Equation 1. The parameters $\{m, \ell\}$ and signals $\{s, t_1, t_2, \dots, t_N\}$
 114 are unknown to the DM.

Suppose the DM considers the simple average of agents' predictions as an estimator for θ . Let x_i be agent i 's reported prediction on θ . Suppose all agents report their best guesses, i.e. $x_i = E[\theta|s, t_i]$. Then the average prediction is given by

$$\bar{x}_N = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N x_i = (1 - \omega)s + \omega \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N t_i.$$

115 Note that $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N = \bar{x} = (1 - \omega)s + \omega\theta \neq \theta$ if $s \neq \theta$, i.e. average prediction is not a
 116 consistent estimator of θ unless the shared information is perfectly accurate (Palley and
 117 Soll, 2019). Increasing the sample size does not alleviate the shared-information problem

¹For an example model with linear posterior expectation, let $Beta(m_0\mu_0, m_0(1 - \mu_0))$ be the common prior. Common and private signals are the average of m_1 and ℓ realizations from the Bernoulli process with probability θ , respectively. Then, the posterior belief of an agent i on θ follows $Beta(ms + \ell t_i, m(1 - s) + \ell(1 - t_i))$ with $E[\theta|s, t_i] = (1 - \omega)s + \omega t_i$ where $\omega = \ell/(m + \ell)$

118 because s is incorporated in \bar{x}_N by each additional prediction. Shared information causes
 119 a correlation between predictions and leads to a persistent error in \bar{x}_N . Section 3 develops
 120 the Surprising Overshoot algorithm, which constructs an estimator that accounts for the
 121 shared-information problem.

122 3 The Surprising Overshoot algorithm

123 The Surprising Overshoot algorithm relies on an augmented elicitation procedure and
 124 the information revealed by the distribution of agents' reports to construct an estimator.
 125 Section 3.1 introduces the elicitation procedure. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 elaborates on the re-
 126 lationship between agents' equilibrium reports and the resulting average prediction. Section
 127 3.4 develops the SO estimator.

128 3.1 Belief elicitation

129 The DM simultaneously and separately asks each agent i to submit two reports. In the
 130 first, the agent is asked to make a *prediction* $x_i \in [0, 1]$ on θ . In the second, the agent reports
 131 a *meta-prediction* $z_i \in [0, 1]$, which is an estimate of the average prediction of agents $j \in$
 132 $\{1, 2, \dots, N\} \setminus \{i\}$, denoted by $\bar{x}_{-i} = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{j \neq i} x_j$. Agents' reports are incentivized by a strictly
 133 proper scoring rule (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007). Let $\pi_{xi} = S_x(x_i, y)$ and $\pi_{zi} = S_z(z_i, \bar{x}_{-i})$ be
 134 the ex-post payoffs of an agent i from the prediction and meta-prediction where S_x and S_z are
 135 strictly proper scoring rules satisfying $\theta = \arg \max_{u \in \mathbb{R}} S_x(u, Y)$ and $\bar{x}_{-i} = \arg \max_{u \in \mathbb{R}} S_z(u, \bar{x}_{-i})$.
 136 Agent i 's total payoff is given by $\pi_i = \pi_{xi} + \pi_{zi}$.

137 An agent i 's report is *truthful* if $(x_i, z_i) = (E[\theta|s, t_i], E[\bar{x}_{-i}|s, t_i])$, i.e. agent i reports her
 138 posterior expectations on θ and \bar{x}_{-i} as prediction and meta-prediction respectively. Truthful
 139 reporting represents the situation where reports are truthful for all $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$.

140 **Theorem 1.** *Truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous reporting*
 141 *game.*

Proofs of all theorems and lemmas are included in Appendix A. Intuitively, Theorem 1 follows from the use of proper scoring rules. Agents are incentivized to report their best estimates on the unknown probability and the average of others' predictions. In equilibrium, we have $x_i = E[\theta|s, t_i] = (1 - \omega)s + \omega t_i$ for all $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$. Then, agent i 's equilibrium meta-prediction is given by $E[\bar{x}_{-i}|s, t_i] = (1 - \omega)s + \omega \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{j \neq i} E[t_j|s, t_i]$. Observe that $E[t_j|s, t_i] = E[E[t_j|\theta]|s, t_i] = E[\theta|s, t_i]$, i.e. agent i 's expectation on another agent's signal is her expectation on θ , which is equal to the truthful prediction. Thus, the equilibrium prediction and meta-prediction of an agent i are given by:

$$x_i = (1 - \omega)s + \omega t_i \tag{2}$$

$$z_i = (1 - \omega)s + \omega x_i \tag{3}$$

142 In the remainder of this section, I assume truthful reporting and hence, each agent i 's
 143 reported predictions and meta-predictions are given by Equations 2 and 3 respectively.

144 3.2 Overshoot rates in predictions and meta-predictions

145 A prediction or meta-prediction is said to *overshoot* the average prediction \bar{x}_N if it exceeds
 146 \bar{x}_N . For any arbitrary agent i , there are two overshoot indicators. For example, if $x_i > \bar{x}_N >$
 147 z_i , agent i 's prediction x_i overshoots the average prediction while the meta-prediction z_i does
 148 not overshoot.

149 **Lemma 1 (Overshoot in prediction).** *An agent i 's prediction x_i overshoots \bar{x}_N if and*
 150 *only if her private signal t_i overshoots the average signal $\bar{t} = \sum_{k=1}^N t_k$. For $N \rightarrow \infty$, we have*
 151 $x_i > \bar{x} \iff t_i > \theta$ *where $\bar{x} = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N$ is the population average of predictions.*

152 **Lemma 2 (Overshoot in meta-prediction).** *An agent i 's meta-prediction z_i overshoots*
 153 *\bar{x}_N if and only if her prediction x_i overshoots the average signal $\bar{t} = \sum_{k=1}^N t_k$. For $N \rightarrow \infty$, we*
 154 *have $z_i > \bar{x} \iff x_i > \theta$ where $\bar{x} = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N$ is the population average of predictions.*

Lemmas 1 and 2 suggest a pattern of predictions as $N \rightarrow \infty$. According to Lemma 1, an agent i 's prediction x_i overshoots \bar{x} if and only if $t_i > \theta$. However, for meta-prediction z_i to overshoot \bar{x} , we must have $x_i = (1 - \omega)s + \omega t_i > \theta$. Thus, we do not necessarily have $z_i > \bar{x}_i$ whenever $x_i > \bar{x}$ is satisfied. Consider the following measures computed using predictions and meta-predictions:

$$p_x = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1}(x_i > \bar{x})$$

$$p_z = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1}(z_i > \bar{x})$$

155 The measures p_x and p_z represent the population proportion of predictions and meta-
 156 predictions that overshoot the population average \bar{x} . I refer to p_x and p_z as the *overshoot*
 157 *rate* in predictions and meta-predictions respectively. From Lemma 2, we can infer that p_z
 158 also corresponds the population proportion of predictions that overshoot θ .

159 **3.3 Overshoot surprise as an indicator of the inconsistency in the** 160 **average prediction**

161 Overshoot rates in predictions and meta-predictions provide an indicator for a miscali-
 162 bration in the average prediction \bar{x}_N . Theorem 2 establishes a result for the case where \bar{x}_N
 163 is a consistent estimator.

164 **Theorem 2.** *Overshoot rates satisfy $p_x = p_z$ when \bar{x}_N is a consistent estimator of θ*

165 Theorem 2 describes a situation where there is no shared information problem in the
 166 average prediction. This corresponds to the special case of $s = \theta$. Then, $\bar{x} = \theta$ and it follows
 167 from Lemma 2 that an agent's prediction and meta-prediction are always on the same side
 168 of \bar{x} , which implies $p_x = p_z$.

169 What if $s \neq \theta$ and \bar{x}_N is an inconsistent estimator? Then we have $\bar{x} \neq \theta$ and there could
 170 be instances where an agent's prediction and meta-prediction falls on different sides of \bar{x} .

171 Figure 1 below shows one such example:




Figure 1: An example case where an agent's meta-prediction z_i overshoots \bar{x} while prediction x_i undershoots. The dashed lines show how x_i, z_i and \bar{x} are determined given $\{s, t_i, \theta\}$ from Equations 2, 3 and $\bar{x} = (1 - \omega)s + \omega\theta$.

172 In the example case, \bar{x}_N is an inconsistent estimator of θ because $s > \theta$ leads to $\bar{x} > \theta$.
 173 Note that we also have $\theta < x_i < z_i$. Intuitively, prediction x_i overestimates θ because $s > \theta$.
 174 Meta-prediction z_i is the combination of agent i 's best estimate on the average signal (which
 175 converges to θ in the limit) and s . Since x_i overestimates θ , by Lemma 2 meta-prediction z_i
 176 overshoots \bar{x} . However, following Lemma 1, x_i still undershoots \bar{x} because $t_i < \theta$. Therefore,
 177 we get $x_i < \bar{x} < z_i$.

178 Figure 1 suggests that the prediction and meta-prediction of a given agent can be on
 179 different sides of \bar{x} when $s \neq \theta$. Then, overshoot rate in predictions (p_x) and meta-predictions
 180 (p_z) may differ.

181 **Definition 1 (Overshoot surprise).** *An overshoot surprise occurs when $p_z \neq p_x$. The*
 182 *overshoot surprise is positive if $p_z > p_x$ and negative if $p_z < p_x$. The size of the overshoot*
 183 *surprise is given by $\Delta p = p_z - p_x$.*

184 The following result relates overshoot surprise to inconsistency in \bar{x}_N :

185 **Theorem 3.** *Overshoot rates satisfy $p_z \geq p_x$ ($p_z \leq p_x$) when $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N > \theta$ ($\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N < \theta$).*
 186 *Furthermore, Δp is a monotonically increasing function of $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} (\bar{x}_N - \theta)$.*

187 Theorem 3 establishes that an overshoot surprise is an indicator of the size and direc-
 188 tion of the inconsistency in \bar{x}_N resulting from the shared-information problem. A positive
 189 overshoot surprise suggests that the average prediction overestimates θ while a negative

190 overshoot surprise suggests underestimation. Furthermore, the size of the overshoot sur-
 191 prise positively correlates with the asymptotic bias in \bar{x}_N . These observations motivate the
 192 Surprising Overshoot estimator introduced below.

193 3.4 The Surprising Overshoot estimator

194 Let F be the cumulative population density of predictions. Also let the function $Q(q) =$
 195 $\inf\{x \in \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\} | F(x) \geq q\}$ represent the population quantile of predictions at a
 196 given cumulative density $q \in [0, 1]$. We can consider \bar{x}_N as an estimator for $Q(1 - p_x)$ because
 197 $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N = \bar{x} = Q(1 - p_x)$. Section 3.3 suggests that an inconsistency in \bar{x}_N is reflected in how
 198 overshoot rates p_x and p_z are related. Consider the case of $p_z > p_x$, i.e. a positive overshoot
 199 surprise. Then, \bar{x}_N overestimates θ in the limit, suggesting that an estimator that converges
 200 to a lower quantile of F could be more accurate. Theorem 4 suggests that $Q(1 - p_z)$ is the
 201 target quantile.

202 **Theorem 4.** *If there exists at least one $x_i \in \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\}$ such that $x_i = \theta$, then $Q(1 -$
 203 $p_z) = x_i = \theta$.*

204 Intuitively, if there is at least one perfectly accurate agent in the population, $Q(1 - p_z)$
 205 locates her prediction. What if there is no such agent? Then, $Q(1 - p_z)$ equals to the
 206 prediction(s) that fall closest to θ among all predictions smaller than θ . In that case, θ lies
 207 at a convex combination of $Q(1 - p_z)$ and $\inf\{x \in \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\} | x > Q(1 - p_z)\}$. Theorem
 208 3 showed that $p_z \neq p_x$ when \bar{x}_N is an inconsistent estimator. For example, we have $p_z > p_x$
 209 when \bar{x}_N has an upward asymptotic bias, implying that $Q(1 - p_z)$ is a smaller quantile than
 210 \bar{x} (which corresponds to $Q(1 - p_x)$). Thus, even if $Q(1 - p_z)$ differs from θ , it would be closer
 211 to θ than \bar{x} in most cases. Theorem 2 showed that $p_x = p_z$ when there is no asymptotic bias
 212 in \bar{x}_N . Thus, $Q(1 - p_z) = Q(1 - p_x) = \bar{x}$ when \bar{x}_N is a consistent estimator.

213 Theorem 4 applies for the limiting case where the whole population of agents is available.
 214 In practice, the DM can only recruit a finite sample of agents. The population distribu-
 215 tion F and the quantile function Q are unknown. Thus, $Q(1 - p_z)$ cannot be calculated.

216 Let \hat{F}_N be the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) and $\hat{Q}_N(q) = \inf\{x \in$
217 $\{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\} | \hat{F}_N(x) \geq q\}$ represent the corresponding sample quantile function in a finite
218 sample of agents of size N . Also let $\hat{p}_{xN} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1}(x_i > \bar{x}_N)$ and $\hat{p}_{zN} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1}(z_i > \bar{x}_N)$ be
219 the sample overshoot rate in predictions and meta-predictions respectively. The definition
220 below introduces the Surprising Overshoot (SO) algorithm:

221 **Definition 2 (The Surprising Overshoot algorithm).** *The Surprising Overshoot algo-*
222 *rithm constructs the SO estimator x_N^{SO} for θ following the steps below:*

- 223 1. Elicit $\{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\}$ and $\{z_1, z_2, \dots, z_N\}$
- 224 2. Calculate $\hat{p}_{zN} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1}(z_i > \bar{x}_N)$.
- 225 3. Set $x_N^{SO} = \hat{Q}_N(1 - \hat{p}_{zN})$ where \hat{Q}_N is the sample quantile function.

226 The SO algorithm simply locates the $1 - \hat{p}_{zN}$ quantile of the sample predictions where
227 quantile function is the inverse of empirical CDF. An alternative formulation (elaborated
228 in Section 4.4) interpolates between the order statistics to construct a continuous quantile
229 function.

230 Why should x_N^{SO} be a better estimator than \bar{x}_N ? Theorem 4 shows that $Q(1 - p_z)$ is
231 either equal to or falls very close to θ . If the sample quantile $\hat{Q}_N(1 - \hat{p}_{zN})$ converges to the
232 population counterpart for $N \rightarrow \infty$, we would expect very little or no asymptotic bias in
233 x_N^{SO} . In contrast, \bar{x}_N could exhibit a substantial asymptotic bias. The SO estimator picks a
234 lower or higher quantile depending on the direction and size of the asymptotic bias in \bar{x}_N .

235 Section 4 presents supporting empirical evidence. Firstly, sample overshoot surprises
236 (calculated using \hat{p}_{zN} and \hat{p}_{xN}) strongly correlate with the forecasting errors of average
237 prediction. The sample measures exhibit the pattern predicted by Theorem 3 in the limit.
238 Secondly, the SO estimator produces significantly more accurate estimates than the average
239 prediction. Section 3.5 elaborates on when we expect the SO algorithm to perform well and
240 motivates the empirical analysis.

241 3.5 Effectiveness of the SO estimator

242 The SO estimator relies on the empirical distribution of predictions as well as agents’
 243 meta-predictions. This property has implications about the prediction problems where we
 244 may expect the SO algorithm to be more effective. To illustrate, consider the two example
 245 empirical densities below. Both figures depict predictions from a sample of 10 agents where
 246 the sample average prediction is 0.4 while $\theta = 0.25$. In Figure 2a agents report one of 0.5, 0.3
 247 or 0.1 as prediction. The distribution of predictions in Figure 2b is more dispersed around
 248 the average prediction. Suppose the meta-predictions in each example (not shown on figures)
 249 are such that $\hat{p}_{zN} = 0.2$ in both cases. Then the SO estimate is $1 - \hat{p}_{zN} = 0.8$ quantile of
 250 the empirical density of predictions. The orange bar in each figure locates the SO estimate.




Figure 2: Two examples of empirical density of predictions

251 The SO estimate is more accurate in the high dispersion case simply because the 0.2
 252 quantile falls closer to θ . The SO algorithm picks the prediction that corresponds to the
 253 sample quantile $1 - \hat{p}_{zN}$. So the set of values x_N^{SO} can take depends on the empirical density
 254 of predictions. Even when $1 - \hat{p}_{zN}$ provides an accurate estimate of the cumulative density at
 255 θ , the SO estimate may not be more accurate than \bar{x}_N simply because $1 - \hat{p}_{zN}$ quantile of the
 256 sample predictions is not close to θ . Such cases are less likely when the sample size is higher
 257 and/or the empirical density of predictions is more dispersed, as in Figure 2b. Therefore, we
 258 may expect the SO algorithm to perform better in larger samples and when the predictions

259 are more dispersed. Intuitively, high dispersion can be considered as representing prediction
260 tasks where individual judgments disagree, which could occur when the event of interest is
261 highly uncertain and there is no strong consensus among forecasters. The following sections
262 test the SO algorithm using experimental data. In the analyses below, sample size and
263 dispersion of predictions are considered to be the factors of interest.

264 4 Testing the SO algorithm

265 This section outlines the empirical methodology and presents some preliminary evidence
266 on overshoot surprises. I use data from various experimental studies to test the SO algorithm.
267 Section 4.1 provides information on the data sets. Section 4.2 gives an overview of the
268 empirical methodology. In testing the SO algorithm, I follow a comparative approach. The
269 analysis will implement various alternative methods as a benchmark and test if the SO
270 algorithm performs significantly better. Section 4.3 introduces the benchmarks. Section
271 4.4 specifies the types of quantile functions used in implementation of the SO algorithm.
272 Section 4.5 provides some preliminary findings on overshoot surprises and how they relate
273 to the inconsistency in the simple average of predictions.

274 4.1 Data sets

275 I use data from three experimental studies². The first data set comes from Study 1 in
276 Palley and Soll (2019). They conducted an online experiment where subjects reported their
277 prediction and meta-prediction on the number of heads in 100 flips of a biased two-sided coin.
278 The actual probability of heads is unknown to the subjects. Prior to submitting a report
279 on a coin, each subject observed two independent samples of flips. One sample is common
280 to all subjects and represents the shared signal. The second sample is subject-specific and

²Supplemental material including all data sets and R scripts (R Core Team, 2020; Wickham et al., 2022; Wickham, 2016, 2007; Wickham and Girlich, 2022) for reproducing all empirical results below are available at <https://github.com/cempeker/supplemental/tree/main/surpovershoot>

281 constitutes a subject’s private signal. A subject’s best guess on the number of heads in
282 100 new flips is effectively that subject’s best guess on the unknown bias. Thus, the “Coin
283 Flips” data set includes predictions on an unknown probability and meta-predictions on the
284 average prediction of other subjects.

285 Study 1 in Palley and Soll (2019) implements three different information structures. All
286 subjects observe the shared signal and a private signal in the ‘Symmetric’ setup while only
287 a subset of subjects observe a private signal in the ‘Nested-Symmetric’ structure. Private
288 signals are subject-specific and unbiased in both structures, which agrees with the theoretical
289 framework of the SO algorithm. The other setup is referred to as the ‘Nested’ structure, in
290 which private signals are not subject-specific. The average of private signals do not converge
291 to the true value, which deviates from the theoretical framework of the SO algorithm. Thus,
292 all results from Coin Flips data in Section 5 exclude ‘Nested’ structure and use the prediction
293 data (48 distinct coins) from the ‘Symmetric’ and ‘Nested-Symmetric’ structures only. For
294 completeness, Appendix E presents an analysis using data from the ‘Nested’ structure.

295 The Coin Flips data set from Palley and Soll (2019)’s Study 1 allows testing the SO
296 algorithm in a controlled setup. Since the unknown probabilities are known to the analyst,
297 it is possible to calculate prediction errors directly. The number of subjects per coin vary
298 between 101 and 125. Palley and Soll (2019) run a second study where they use the same
299 tasks as in Study 1. However they vary subjects’ incentives and the sample sizes are much
300 smaller. Thus, their second study will not be considered here.

301 The second source of data involves two experimental studies from Wilkening et al. (2021).
302 The first replicates the experiment initially conducted by Prelec et al. (2017). For each U.S.
303 state, subjects are asked if the largest city is the capital of that state. Prelec et al. (2017)
304 required subjects to pick true or false and report the percentage of other subjects who would
305 agree with them. Wilkening et al. (2021) asked subjects to report probabilistic predictions
306 and meta-predictions on the statement (largest city being the capital city), which allows us
307 to implement the SO algorithm. The “State Capital” data set includes data from 89 subjects

308 in total and each subject answered 50 questions (one per state). In the second experiment,
309 subjects are presented with U.S. grade school level true/false general science statements such
310 as ‘Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level’, ‘Materials that let electricity pass through
311 them easily are called insulators’ and ‘Voluntary muscles are controlled by the cerebrum’.
312 The “General Knowledge” data includes judgments on 500 such statements in total. Each
313 subject reports a prediction and a meta-prediction on the probability of a statement being
314 true for 100 statements. The number of subjects reporting on a given statement varies
315 between 89 to 95.

316 **4.2 Methodology**

317 The empirical analysis tests the accuracy of the SO algorithm using the prediction and
318 meta-prediction data from the Coin Flips, General Knowledge and State Capital data sets.
319 For each prediction task, I calculate the SO estimate as well as aggregate estimates from
320 the alternative aggregation methods that are considered as benchmarks. Section 4.3 provide
321 information on these benchmarks. In each data set, the performance of a method is based
322 on an average measure of accuracy across all prediction tasks. In the Coin Flips data
323 set, the unknown probability of interest is known to the aggregator. Thus, accuracy is
324 measured by the difference between the estimate and the actual probability. In contrast, the
325 General Knowledge and State Capital tasks have a binary truth. I calculate Brier scores to
326 evaluate the aggregate estimates. In all data sets, the analysis follows a bootstrap approach
327 to compare forecast errors across the aggregation methods. Section 5 elaborates on the
328 accuracy measures and the bootstrap analyses.

329 Section 3.5 argued that the SO algorithm could be more effective in moderate to large
330 crowds and/or when predictions are more dispersed. In each data set, I generate bootstrap
331 samples of different sizes and evaluate the relative accuracy of the SO estimate as the crowd
332 size increases. Furthermore, the statements in General Knowledge and State Capital data
333 sets differ in terms of the presence of a strong consensus among the predictions. This

334 allows us to investigate how the extent of disagreement in predictions relates to the relative
 335 performance of SO algorithm. To illustrate, consider the two example items from the General
 336 Knowledge data in Figure 3 below:




Figure 3: Predictions on two example items from the General Knowledge data

337 For the item in the left panel, a large proportion of predictions are at 100% and almost
 338 all predictions are 50% or higher. The dispersion of predictions is smaller than the item in
 339 the right panel, where predictions vary from 0% to 100%. Similar examples can be found in
 340 the State Capital data. I classify the items in General Knowledge and State Capital data
 341 sets in three categories (low, medium and high dispersion of predictions) and investigate if
 342 the SO estimator is more accurate than the benchmarks under high dispersion. Figure C1 in
 343 Appendix C suggest that the dispersion of predictions vary much less across the Coin Flips
 344 tasks compared to the General Knowledge and State Capital tasks. The level of dispersion
 345 in Coin Flips predictions is relatively low as well. The low, medium and high dispersion
 346 categories of tasks would not be distinct in the Coin Flips data and almost all coin flips
 347 tasks would qualify as low dispersion considering other data sets. Therefore, the analysis on
 348 the effect of dispersion uses the General Knowledge and State Capital data only.

349 4.3 Benchmarks

350 The benchmarks in testing the SO algorithm can be categorized in two groups. I will
351 first consider *simple benchmarks*, namely the simple average and median prediction. Simple
352 averaging is an easy and intuitive aggregation method. The median forecast is also popular
353 because it is more robust to outliers. These simple aggregation methods do not require
354 meta-predictions, which makes them easier to implement. However, as shown in Section 2
355 with simple averaging, these methods may produce an inaccurate aggregate judgment. As
356 discussed in Section 1, there exists a growing literature which provides more sophisticated
357 solutions to the aggregation problem utilizing meta-beliefs. I consider three *advanced bench-*
358 *marks*: Pivoting (Palley and Soll, 2019), knowledge-weighting (Palley and Satopää, 2022),
359 and meta-probability weighting (Martinie et al., 2020).

360 The pivoting method first computes simple average of predictions and meta-predictions, \bar{x}
361 and \bar{z} in our notation respectively. Then the mechanism pivots from \bar{x} in different directions.
362 The pivot in the direction of \bar{z} provides an estimate for the shared information while the
363 step in the opposite direction gives an estimate for the average of private signals. These
364 estimates are combined using Bayesian weights to produce the optimal aggregate estimate.
365 The canonical pivoting method requires knowledge of the Bayesian weight ω to determine the
366 optimal pivot size and aggregation. Palley and Soll (2019) propose minimal pivoting (MP)
367 as a simple variant which adjusts \bar{x} by $\bar{x} - \bar{z}$. The adjustment moves the aggregate estimate
368 away from the shared information and alleviates the shared-information problem. MP does
369 not require the knowledge of ω but it may only partially correct for the inconsistency in \bar{x} .

370 Knowledge-weighting (KW) proposes a weighted crowd average as the aggregate predic-
371 tion. The weights are estimated by minimizing the peer prediction gap, which measures the
372 accuracy of weighted crowds' aggregate meta-prediction in estimating the average predic-
373 tion. In a similar framework to Section 2, Palley and Satopää (2022) show that minimizing
374 the peer prediction gap is a proxy for minimizing the mean squared error of a weighted
375 aggregate prediction. Intuitively, KW is motivated by the idea that a weighted crowd that

376 is accurate in predicting others could be more accurate in predicting the unknown quantity
377 itself as well. The KW estimate is simply the weighted average prediction of such a crowd.
378 Palley and Satopää (2022) also develop an outlier-robust KW. Since probabilistic judgments
379 are bounded, we may not expect a severe outlier problem. Palley and Satopää (2022) im-
380 plement the KW method in the Coin Flips data. Their results suggest that standard KW
381 performs better than outlier-robust KW. Thus, I consider standard KW as a benchmark in
382 the analyses below.³

383 Meta-probability weighting (MPW) aims to construct a weighted average of probabilistic
384 predictions. Martinie et al. (2020) consider a slightly different Bayesian setup where agents
385 receive a private signal from one of the two signal technologies, one for experts and the
386 other for novices. The absolute difference between an agent’s optimal prediction and meta-
387 prediction is higher if the agent’s signal is more informative. Based on this result, the MPW
388 algorithm assigns weights proportional to the absolute differences between their prediction
389 and meta-prediction. It is expected that agents with more informative private signals receive
390 higher weights and the resulting weighted average is more accurate than the unweighted
391 average of predictions.

392 Similar to the advanced benchmarks listed above, the SO algorithm relies on an aug-
393 mented elicitation procedure that elicits meta-predictions in addition to predictions. In
394 contrast, the mechanisms in simple benchmarks do not require information from meta-
395 predictions. Thus, we may expect the SO algorithm to significantly outperform simple
396 benchmarks. The advanced benchmarks have similar information demands to the SO algo-
397 rithm, which makes them appropriate benchmarks for a comparative analysis.

³The R package `metaggR` provided by Palley and Satopää (2022) is used to implement knowledge-weighting.

398 **4.4 Implementation of the SO algorithm**

399 The SO algorithm locates a sample quantile according to the quantile function \hat{Q}_N .
 400 The exact estimate depends on the specification of the quantile function. For robustness,
 401 the analysis implements two versions of the algorithm. In the first, the quantile function
 402 $\hat{Q}_N(q)$ is a step function given by the inverse empirical CDF. The second implementation
 403 interpolates between order statistics to construct a piecewise linear quantile function. To
 404 illustrate, suppose we have a sample of 5 predictions given by $\{0.15, 0.2, 0.3, 0.65, 0.9\}$. Figure
 405 4 depicts the quantile function corresponding to each implementation:




Figure 4: Example quantile functions for the implementations of the SO algorithm.

406 Section 5 presents results from the implementation where the quantile function is as in
 407 Figure 4a. Appendix F runs the same analysis, except that the quantile function used in the
 408 SO algorithm follows the interpolation approach in Figure 4b. Both specifications produce
 409 very similar results. Therefore, the same conclusions apply.

410 **4.5 Preliminary evidence on overshoot surprises**

411 Section 3 established a relationship between the size and direction of overshoot surprises
 412 and prediction errors. The more p_z differs from p_x , the higher the overshoot surprise, sug-
 413 gesting a higher miscalibration in the average prediction. Presence of an overshoot surprise

414 relates to the performance of the SO algorithm as well. We may expect a larger error
 415 reduction from using the SO algorithm when $|p_z - p_x|$ is larger.

416 The Coin Flips data set presents an opportunity to investigate whether overshoot sur-
 417 prises correlate with the inconsistency in the average prediction. In this experiment, both
 418 the shared signal s and the unknown probability θ in each coin are generated by the exper-
 419 imenter. Recall from Theorem 3 that a positive (negative) overshoot surprise is associated
 420 with $\bar{x} > \theta$ ($\bar{x} < \theta$), which correspond to the case of $s > \theta$ ($s < \theta$). We expect no overshoot
 421 surprise if $s = \theta$, resulting in \bar{x} being perfectly accurate. Since the information on s and θ is
 422 available, we can investigate if this pattern is observed in the sample data. Figure 5 shows
 423 the relationship between $\Delta\hat{p} = \hat{p}_z - \hat{p}_x$ (size of the sample overshoot surprise) and $s - \theta$.
 424 Each dot represents an item (a distinct coin) and the blue line shows the best linear fit.




Figure 5: The relationship between $s - \theta$ and overshoot surprises ($\Delta\hat{p}$) in prediction tasks. Shaded areas show the regions where the signs of $s - \theta$ and $\Delta\hat{p}$ are as predicted by Theorem 3.

425 Figure 5 shows a strong linear association between $s - \theta$ and overshoot surprise ($\Delta\hat{p}$).
 426 Also observe that most of the points are within the shaded regions. A positive (negative)
 427 overshoot surprise is much more likely to occur when $s > \theta$ ($s < \theta$). In addition, $|\Delta\hat{p}|$ is

428 higher when the absolute difference between s and θ is higher. In accordance with Theorem
429 3, an overshoot surprise is a strong indicator of the size and direction of the inconsistency
430 in the average prediction. The SO estimator can be thought of as \bar{x}_N adjusted away from
431 the direction of the asymptotic bias where the adjustment is determined by the sign and
432 magnitude of the overshoot surprise. Thus, Figure 5 suggests a potential error reduction
433 from using the SO algorithm. Section 5 explores whether the SO algorithm improves over
434 various benchmarks.

435 5 Results

436 This section presents empirical evidence on the performance of the SO algorithm. Sec-
437 tion 5.1 implements the SO algorithm and benchmarks in the Coin Flips data. The results
438 demonstrate the accuracy of the SO estimator as the crowd size increases. Section 5.2 imple-
439 ments the SO algorithm and benchmarks in the General Knowledge and State Capital data
440 sets. This section analyzes the accuracy of the SO algorithm at different levels of dispersion
441 in predictions as well as investigating the effect of crowd size. I present evidence suggesting
442 that the SO estimator performs especially well when predictions disagree greatly.


443 5.1 Coin Flips data

444 The empirical analysis follows a bootstrap approach similar to Palley and Satopää (2022).
445 For each item (prediction task) in the Coin Flips data set, a subset of subjects of size M
446 is randomly selected to construct a bootstrap sample. Then, for each sample and item I
447 compute the absolute and squared error of aggregate predictions from the benchmarks and
448 the SO algorithm. The average of squared errors across the items gives a measure of the
449 corresponding method’s error in that task. This procedure is run 1000 times for each crowd
450 size $M \in \{10, 20, \dots, 100\}$ to obtain 1000 data points of absolute error and root mean squared
451 error (RMSE) for each aggregation method. The observations from bootstrap samples allow

452 us to test for differences in errors between the SO algorithm and a benchmark. I consider
 453 two measures for comparison. Firstly, I calculate average RMSE across all iterations for each
 454 method. Then, it is possible to observe how average RMSE changes across M . Secondly,
 455 I log transform the absolute errors and calculate pairwise differences for each iteration to
 456 construct 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for each M . The differences in log-transformed
 457 errors can be interpreted as percentage error reduction (SO estimator vs benchmark). The
 458 bootstrap approach also allows us to see the effect of crowd size on the SO estimates.

459 Figure 6 presents the results of the bootstrap analysis. Figure 6a depicts the average
 460 RMSE across iterations while Figure 6b shows the bootstrap confidence intervals for reduc-
 461 tion in log absolute error (the SO estimator vs benchmark). Box plots show 2.5%, 25%, 50%,
 462 75% and 97.5% quantiles in pairwise differences in log-transformed errors. Points above the
 463 0-line represent bootstrap runs where the SO estimate has a lower error.

(a) Average RMSE vs (bootstrap) crowd size



(b) Reduction in log absolute error (averaged across items) in Bootstrap samples




Figure 6: Bootstrap analysis on Coin Flips data

464 Figure 6a shows that the SO algorithm achieves the lowest error in samples of more
465 than 30 subjects. Observe that increasing the sample size has a stronger effect on the SO
466 estimator. Almost all aggregation methods benefit from larger samples due to the wisdom
467 of crowds effect. For the SO algorithm, benefits of a larger crowd are twofold. Not only the
468 wisdom of crowds effect becomes more pronounced, but also a larger sample of predictions
469 typically has a smoother empirical density. Then, the SO algorithm can produce a more
470 precise estimate, as illustrated in Figure 2.

471 Figure 6b indicates that the SO algorithm outperforms the simple benchmarks. We also
472 see that the SO algorithm achieves lower errors in most bootstrap samples than the advanced
473 benchmarks. Appendix D provides the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals depicted in Figure
474 6b. The SO algorithm improves the accuracy by 30-50% relative to the simple benchmarks.
475 In large samples, the median percentage error reduction with respect to MP, KW and MPW
476 is around 7%, 8% and 25% respectively.

477 The Coin Flips study elicits judgments in a controlled setup. As discussed in Section 4.2,

478 the dispersion of predictions do not differ greatly across tasks. Section 5.2 presents evi-
 479 dence from General Knowledge and State Capital data, where subjects report probabilistic
 480 judgments on practical statements. Individual predictions are highly dispersed in some state-
 481 ments while there is a stronger consensus in others. This variety allows an analysis on the
 482 effectiveness of the SO algorithm for different levels of dispersion as well as crowd size.

483 5.2 General Knowledge and State Capital data

Unlike the Coin Flips data, the items in the State Capital and General Knowledge data
 have a binary truth. I follow a similar approach to Budescu and Chen (2015) and Martinie
 et al. (2020) and calculate transformed Brier scores associated with the aggregate estimates
 of each method in each data set. The transformed Brier score of a method i in a given data
 set is defined as

$$S_i = 100 - 100 \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{(o_j - x_j^i)^2}{J}$$

484 where $o_j \in \{0, 1\}$ be the outcome of event j , J is the total number of events in the data
 485 set and $x_j^i \in [0, 1]$ is the aggregate probabilistic prediction of method i on event j . The
 486 transformed Brier score is strictly proper and assigns a score within $[0, 100]$. We want to test
 487 whether the SO algorithm achieves a higher transformed Brier score than the benchmarks.

488 Similar to Section 5.1, I follow a bootstrap approach. However, unlike Section 5.1 I test
 489 the SO algorithm at different levels of dispersion of predictions as well as crowd size. Thus,
 490 this section presents results from two different bootstrap analyses. The first is similar to the
 491 analysis in Section 5.1, except that the transformed Brier score is used as a measure of accu-
 492 racy. I generate 1000 bootstrap samples of subjects for each crowd size $M \in \{10, 20, \dots, 80\}$
 493 and implement all aggregation methods in each bootstrap sample. The maximum crowd size
 494 is set at 80 because the number of subjects varies between 89 and 95. Then, I construct 95%
 495 confidence intervals for pairwise differences in transformed Brier scores of the SO estimator

496 and each benchmark. Figure 7 depicts the bootstrap confidence intervals for each data set.
 497 An observation above the 0-line indicates that the SO estimator achieved a higher trans-
 498 formed Brier score than the corresponding benchmark in that particular bootstrap sample.
 499 Appendix D provides the exact bounds of the intervals shown in Figure 7.




Figure 7: Difference in Bootstrapped transformed Brier scores (SO vs benchmark) for each crowd size.

500 Figure 7 suggests that increasing the sample size improves the performance of the SO
 501 algorithm relative to the simple average and median prediction in questions with a binary
 502 truth as well. A similar result holds for minimal pivoting, but not for knowledge-weighting
 503 and meta-probability weighting. The results are in accordance with Figure 6. Relative
 504 accuracy of the SO algorithm (weakly) improves as we move from small to moderate or large
 505 samples.

506 I will now investigate if the SO algorithm is more effective than the alternatives when
 507 predictions disagree greatly. We can categorize the General Knowledge and State Capital
 508 items in terms of the dispersion of predictions and run the bootstrap analysis within each

509 category. For the main results below, I use standard deviation of predictions as the measure
510 of dispersion in an item. Appendix G replicates the same analysis using kurtosis as the
511 measure and finds very similar results. In the General Knowledge data, I categorize the
512 items in three groups in terms of the standard deviation of predictions: bottom 10%, middle
513 80% and top 10%. The bottom and top 10% items represent the low and high dispersion
514 items respectively. The State Capital data includes a lower number of items. In order to
515 have a reasonable number of items in each category, the thresholds are set at 25% and
516 75%. Thus, the low, medium and high dispersion categories in the State capital data are
517 bottom 25%, middle 50% and top 25% in terms of standard deviation in predictions. The
518 bootstrap analysis generates samples and calculates transformed Brier scores separately for
519 each dispersion category. A bootstrap sample consists of items from a category sampled with
520 replacement. Each sample produces a transformed Brier score for each method. I generate
521 1000 such bootstrap samples in each category and construct 95% confidence intervals for
522 pairwise differences in transformed Brier scores of the SO estimator and each benchmark.
523 Figure G2 in Appendix G presents the same analysis except that the thresholds are set at
524 33% and 66% in both data sets, which results in an approximately equal number of tasks in
525 each category. Pairwise differences in Brier scores are similar to the results below.

526 Figure 8 presents 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for pairwise differences in trans-
527 formed Brier scores. Panels in the 2x3 grid show the results from low, medium or high
528 dispersion items in each data set. Each box plot shows 2.5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 97.5%
529 quantiles of pairwise differences in transformed Brier scores between the SO estimate and
530 the corresponding benchmark. As in Figure 7, strictly positive pairwise differences would
531 suggest higher accuracy for the SO algorithm than the corresponding benchmark.




Figure 8: Difference in Bootstrapped transformed Brier scores (SO vs benchmark). The scales on y-axis are allowed to be free in each plot on the 2x3 grid

532 Appendix D provides the Bootstrap confidence intervals depicted in Figure 8. The con-
 533 fidence intervals show that the SO estimator significantly outperforms simple average and
 534 median in moderate and high dispersion items. Furthermore, almost all confidence inter-
 535 vals are strictly above the 0-line in the high dispersion category in each data set. In high
 536 dispersion items, the SO algorithm compares favorably to the advanced benchmarks as well.

537 To summarize, results indicate that the SO algorithm is relatively more effective in mod-
 538 erate to large samples and when individual predictions disagree greatly, resulting in a more
 539 dispersed empirical density of predictions. Section 6 provides a further discussion on the
 540 strengths and limitations of the SO algorithm.

541 **6 When and why is the SO algorithm effective?**

542 The findings in Section 5 not only document the effectiveness of the SO algorithm but
543 also provides a “user’s manual” for a DM who intends to use an aggregation algorithm to
544 combine probabilistic judgments. The SO algorithm is expected to perform relatively well
545 in moderate to large samples and when the predictions are highly dispersed. Note that the
546 DM knows or can determine the size of the sample of forecasters. Furthermore, the empirical
547 density of predictions is observable to the DM prior to the resolution of the uncertain event.
548 Thus, the decision to implement the SO algorithm can be based on the sample size and the
549 observed dispersion in predictions.

550 Figures 6 and 7 showed that the forecast errors of the SO algorithm decrease even more
551 rapidly than the benchmarks as the sample size increases. Intuitively, the SO algorithm
552 is more sensitive to the sample size because it relies on the sample density of predictions.
553 The sample quantiles may overlap in very small samples. As the sample size increases, the
554 sample density becomes more representative of the underlying population density and the
555 quantiles could become more distinct. Then, the SO algorithm can produce a more fine-
556 tuned aggregate prediction. The DM should use the SO algorithm if a moderate to large
557 sample of forecasters is available. In very small samples, simple aggregation methods or the
558 MP method may be preferred.

559 The disagreement between experts is also a factor in the effectiveness of the SO algorithm.
560 Consider a situation where there is a strong consensus among experts: individual predic-
561 tions are clustered around a certain value (low dispersion). We can imagine two scenarios in
562 which the DM would observe such a pattern. Experts could be highly accurate individually,
563 in which case a simple average of predictions would perform sufficiently well. In the second
564 scenario, predictions are clustered around an inaccurate value. Then, the majority of pre-
565 dictions would be highly inaccurate. Recent work developed algorithms to pick the correct
566 answer to a multiple choice question when the majority vote is inaccurate (Prelec et al.,
567 2017; Wilkening et al., 2021). An analogous solution in aggregating probabilistic judgments

568 may identify a contrarian but well-calibrated prediction and discard others. As discussed in
569 Section 4.3, the KW and MPW mechanisms set individual weights for aggregation. How-
570 ever, these mechanisms are highly unlikely to attach 0 weight to a very high proportion of
571 predictions. The MP method makes an adjustment based on average prediction and meta-
572 prediction. It does not attempt to locate more accurate experts. In theory, the SO algorithm
573 can pick the sample quantile that corresponds to the contrarian prediction. However, the
574 sample quantiles are close to each other when predictions are highly clustered. Thus, the SO
575 algorithm’s adjustment may not be sufficiently extreme. Alternatively, if the DM expects a
576 strong consensus with reasonably well-calibrated individual expert predictions, eliciting the
577 predictions only and using a simple aggregation method could be preferable. Differences in
578 transformed Brier scores at low dispersion in Figure 8 are smaller than the differences at
579 higher levels of dispersion. Simple aggregation methods could be nearly as accurate as the
580 more sophisticated aggregation algorithms at low dispersion.

581 Now consider a situation of high dispersion in predictions instead. Experts disagree in
582 their predictions and some experts are less accurate (ex-post) than the others. The high dis-
583 persion category in General Knowledge and State Capital studies represent this case. Figure
584 8 suggests that the SO algorithm not only outperforms the simple aggregation methods, but
585 it could also be more effective than the advanced benchmarks as well. The SO algorithm
586 performs well under higher disagreement because the sample quantiles become more distinct,
587 which allows more room for improvement. High dispersion in predictions also allows more
588 precision in the SO estimator. Thus, a DM who observes strong disagreement among indi-
589 vidual predictions may prefer the SO algorithm. Note that an aggregation problem can be
590 considered as more tricky when forecasters strongly disagree. The SO algorithm is particu-
591 larly effective in problems where the DM might need an effective aggregation algorithm the
592 most.

593 The SO algorithm differs from the other aggregation algorithms in its use of the empirical
594 density of predictions. For a given level of overshoot surprise, the absolute difference between

595 the SO estimator and the average prediction depends on the dispersion in the empirical
596 density of predictions. However, the SO algorithm always produces an aggregate estimate
597 that lies within the range of individual predictions. Recall that the MP method uses a fixed
598 step size to adjust the average prediction. In contrast, the SO algorithm’s adjustment on
599 the aggregate prediction is informed and restrained by the empirical density. This makes the
600 SO estimator more robust to potential over-adjustments, which may reduce the calibration
601 of the aggregate prediction even when it is adjusted in the correct direction.

602 **7 Conclusion**

603 Decision makers frequently face the problem of predicting the likelihood of an uncertain
604 event. Leveraging the collective wisdom of many experts has been shown to be a promising
605 solution. However, the use of collective wisdom is not a trivial solution because there are
606 typically no general guidelines on how individual judgments should be aggregated for maxi-
607 mum accuracy. Forecasters typically have shared information through their training, public
608 knowledge, past observations, knowledge of the same academic works, etc. In such cases,
609 the simple average of predictions exhibits the shared-information problem (Palley and Soll,
610 2019). Recent work developed aggregation algorithms that rely on an augmented elicitation
611 procedure (Prelec, 2004; Prelec et al., 2017; Palley and Soll, 2019; Palley and Satopää, 2022;
612 Wilkening et al., 2021). These algorithms use individuals’ meta-beliefs to aggregate predic-
613 tions more effectively. This paper follows a similar approach and proposes a novel algorithm
614 to aggregate probabilistic judgments on the likelihood of an event. The Surprising Overshoot
615 algorithm uses experts’ probabilistic meta-predictions to aggregate their probabilistic pre-
616 dictions. The SO algorithm utilizes the information in meta-predictions and the empirical
617 density of predictions to produce an estimator.

618 Experimental evidence shows that the SO algorithm consistently outperforms simple av-
619 eraging and median prediction. I also compared the SO algorithm to alternative aggregation

620 algorithms that elicit meta-beliefs (Palley and Soll, 2019; Palley and Satopää, 2022; Mar-
621 tinie et al., 2020). The SO algorithm is particularly effective in moderate to large samples of
622 experts and when the empirical density of predictions is highly dispersed. Such high disper-
623 sion is more likely to occur in prediction tasks where forecasters strongly disagree in their
624 individual assessment.

625 In practice, a DM is more likely to need a judgment aggregation algorithm when expert
626 predictions lack a clear consensus. In such decision problems, the DM finds herself with
627 conflicting forecasts with no straightforward way to combine them. The SO algorithm is
628 especially powerful in such challenging aggregation problems because of its effectiveness
629 in aggregating disagreeing judgments. The dispersion in predictions that result from the
630 disagreement among experts works in the algorithm’s favor.

631 Appendices

632 A Proofs

633 A.1 Theorem 1

634 Let agent $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ be an arbitrary agent. Suppose all agents $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\} \setminus$
 635 $\{i\}$ report truthfully, i.e. $(x_j, z_j) = (E[\theta|s, t_j], E[\bar{x}_{-j}|s, t_j])$ where \bar{x}_{-j} represents the average
 636 prediction of all agents excluding j . Truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if
 637 $(x_i, z_i) = (E[\theta|s, t_i], E[\bar{x}_{-i}|s, t_i])$ is agent i 's best response.

638 Let $(x_i^*, z_i^*) = \arg \max_{x_i, z_i} E[\pi_i|s, t_i]$ denote the optimal prediction and meta-prediction that
 639 maximizes agent i 's expected score given $\{s, t_i\}$ and truthful reporting from other agents.
 640 Note that $E[\pi_i|s, t_i] = E[\pi_{x_i}|s, t_i] + E[\pi_{z_i}|s, t_i]$. Agent i 's prediction does not affect $E[\pi_{z_i}|s, t_i]$
 641 as it is completely determined by z_i and \bar{x}_{-i} . Similarly, $E[\pi_{x_i}|s, t_i]$ is determined by x_i
 642 and the realization of Y only. Thus agent i 's meta-prediction has no effect on $E[\pi_{x_i}|s, t_i]$.
 643 Thus, agent i 's maximization problem is separable where $x_i^* = \arg \max_{x_i} E[\pi_{x_i}|s, t_i]$ and $z_i^* =$
 644 $\arg \max_{z_i} E[\pi_{z_i}|s, t_i]$. Recall that π_{x_i} and π_{z_i} are maximized at θ and \bar{x}_{-i} respectively. Then,
 645 $x_i^* = E[\theta|s, t_i]$ and $z_i^* = E[\bar{x}_{-i}|s, t_i]$. Truthful report $(x_i, z_i) = (E[\theta|s, t_i], E[\bar{x}_{-i}|s, t_i])$ is agent
 646 i 's best response, which completes the proof.

647 A.2 Lemma 1

Suppose $x_i > \bar{x}_N$ for an agent i . For this agent, we can write

$$\begin{aligned}
 x_i &> \bar{x}_N \\
 (1 - \omega)s + \omega t_i &> (1 - \omega)s + \omega \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N t_k \\
 t_i &> \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N t_k = \bar{t}
 \end{aligned}$$

648 For $N \rightarrow \infty$, we have $\bar{t} \rightarrow \theta$ and $\bar{x} = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N$, so we get $x_i > \bar{x} \iff t_i > \theta$

649 **A.3 Lemma 2**

Suppose $z_i > \bar{x}_N$ for an agent i . The following holds for z_i :

$$z_i > \bar{x}_N$$

$$(1 - \omega)s + \omega x_i > (1 - \omega)s + \omega \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N t_k$$

$$x_j > \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N t_k = \bar{t}$$

650 For $N \rightarrow \infty$, we have $\bar{t} \rightarrow \theta$ and $\bar{x} = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N$, so we get $z_j > \bar{x} \iff x_j > \theta$

651 **A.4 Theorem 2**

652 The sample average \bar{x}_N is a consistent estimator if $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N = \bar{x} = (1 - \omega)s + \omega\theta = \theta$, which
 653 occurs when $s = \theta$ and there is no shared-information problem. Then, $x_i > \bar{x} \iff z_i > \bar{x}$.
 654 This follows from Lemma 2 and $\bar{x} = \theta$. Thus, an agent's prediction and meta-prediction are
 655 always on the same side of \bar{x} , implying that $p_x = p_z$.

656 **A.5 Theorem 3**

Lemmas 1 and 2 suggest that $p_x \equiv \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1}(t_i > \theta)$ and $p_z \equiv \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1}(x_i > \theta)$.
 Note that $x_i = (1 - \omega)s + \omega t_i > \theta$ holds if and only if $t_i > \theta - ((1 - \omega)/\omega)(s - \theta)$. So, we
 have the following:

$$p_x \equiv \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1}(t_i > \theta) \tag{4}$$

$$p_z \equiv \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1} \left(t_i > \theta - \frac{1 - \omega}{\omega} (s - \theta) \right) \tag{5}$$

657 Consider first the case $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N > \theta$. We have $(1 - \omega)s + \omega\theta > \theta$, which implies $s > \theta$.
 658 Then, we must have $p_z \geq p_x$, with $p_z > p_x$ if there exists at least one private signal $t_i \in$

659 $(\theta - \frac{1-\omega}{\omega}(s - \theta), \theta)$ and $p_z = p_x$ otherwise. Now suppose $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N < \theta$, which occurs when
660 $s < \theta$. Since $s - \theta < 0$, we get $p_z \leq p_x$ where the inequality is strict if there is a private
661 signal t_i that satisfies $t_i \in (\theta, \theta - \frac{1-\omega}{\omega}(s - \theta))$.

662 For the result on Δp , consider two alternative scenarios $s \in \{s^0, s^1\}$ for any given s^0
663 and s^1 . Let $\bar{x}_N^0 = (1 - \omega)s^0 + \omega\bar{t}$ and $\bar{x}_N^1 = (1 - \omega)s^1 + \omega\bar{t}$ be the average prediction when
664 $s = s^0$ and $s = s^1$ respectively. For any given s , the asymptotic bias in \bar{x}_N is given by
665 $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N - \theta = (1 - \omega)(s - \theta)$. Let $\{p_x^0, p_z^0\}$ and $\{p_x^1, p_z^1\}$ be the overshoot rates for $s = s^0$ and
666 $s = s^1$ respectively. Also let $\Delta p^0 = p_z^0 - p_x^0$ and $\Delta p^1 = p_z^1 - p_x^1$. Equation 4 suggests $p_x^0 = p_x^1$
667 and the comparison between Δp^0 and Δp^1 depends on p_z^0 and p_z^1 only. First, consider the
668 case $s^1 < s^0 < \theta$. We have $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} (\bar{x}_N^1 - \theta) < \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} (\bar{x}_N^0 - \theta) < 0$, i.e. there is a negative
669 asymptotic bias in both cases but the bias is stronger for $s = s^1$. Then, we should get
670 $\Delta p^1 \leq \Delta p^0$. Since $s^1 - \theta < s^0 - \theta$, we get $p_z^1 \leq p_z^0$ from Equation 5, leading to $\Delta p^1 \leq \Delta p^0$.
671 Second case is $\theta < s^0 < s^1$. Then, $0 < \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} (\bar{x}_N^0 - \theta) < \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} (\bar{x}_N^1 - \theta)$, i.e. positive
672 asymptotic bias is stronger for $s = s^1$ and we should have $\Delta p^1 \geq \Delta p^0$. Since $s^1 - \theta > s^0 - \theta$
673 Equation 5 suggests $p_z^1 \geq p_z^0$ and hence, $\Delta p^1 \geq \Delta p^0$. Finally, consider $s^0 < \theta < s^1$. We have
674 $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} (\bar{x}_N^0 - \theta) < 0 < \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} (\bar{x}_N^1 - \theta)$, there is a positive bias for $s = s^1$ and negative bias for
675 $s = s^0$. Similar to the second case, it follows from $s^1 - \theta > s^0 - \theta$ that $p_z^1 \geq p_z^0$, which implies
676 $\Delta p^1 \geq \Delta p^0$ as claimed.

677 A.6 Theorem 4

678 Lemma 2 established that $z_i > \bar{x} \iff x_i > \theta$ for any agent i in the limit. So, p_z also
679 measures the population proportion of predictions x_i that overshoot θ . Then, $Q(1 - p_z) \equiv$
680 $\sup\{x \in \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\} | x \leq \theta\}$, i.e. $Q(1 - p_z)$ corresponds to the highest prediction that
681 does not exceed θ . If there exists $x_i \in \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\}$ such that $x_i = \theta$, we must have
682 $Q(1 - p_z) = x_i = \theta$ by definition.

683 B Mixed sample of experts and non-experts

Without loss of generality, let agents $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, K\}$ be the *experts* who observe both the shared signal and a private signal. Agents $i \in \{K + 1, K + 2, \dots, N\}$ are *non-experts* observe the shared signal s only. Then,

$$x_i = \begin{cases} (1 - \omega)s + \omega t_i & \text{for } i \in \{1, 2, \dots, K\} \\ s & \text{for } i \in \{K + 1, K + 2, \dots, N\} \end{cases}$$

684 Also, we have $z_i = (1 - \omega)s + \omega x_i$ for $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, K\}$ while $z_i = s$ for others. Average
 685 prediction is given by $\bar{x}_N = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N x_i = (1 - \omega)s + \omega \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^K t_i$.

686 In this setup, Lemma 1 applies for experts and Lemma 2 apply for all. Consider $i \leq K$
 687 first. We have $x_i > \bar{x}_N$ if and only if $t_i > \bar{t}$ where $\bar{t} = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^K t_i$. Similarly $z_i > \bar{x}_N \iff x_i > \bar{t}$.
 688 For $N \rightarrow \infty$, these conditions become equivalent to Lemmas 1 and 2. Now consider $i > K$.
 689 We have $x_i > \bar{x}_N$ iff $s > \bar{t}$. Then, in the limit $x_i > \bar{x} \iff s > \theta$. Also observe that
 690 $z_i = (1 - \omega)s + \omega E \left[\frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^K t_i \middle| s \right] = s$ for a non-expert. Since $z_i = x_i = s$, we also have
 691 $z_i > \bar{x} \iff x_i = s > \theta$. So, Lemma 2 applies for non-experts as well.

692 Theorems 2, 3 and 4 also hold in a mixed crowd of experts and non-experts. Consider
 693 Theorem 2 first. Average prediction \bar{x}_N is consistent when $s = \theta$. In that case, $\bar{x} = \theta$ and
 694 we have $x_i = z_i = \bar{x} = \theta$ for all $i \in \{K + 1, K + 2, \dots, N\}$. From Lemma 2, prediction
 695 and meta-prediction of either an experts or a non-experts always falls on the same side of
 696 \bar{x} , implying that Theorem 2 holds. Next, consider Theorem 3. We always have $x_i = z_i = s$
 697 for all $i \in \{K + 1, K + 2, \dots, N\}$, i.e. a non-experts prediction and meta-prediction are the
 698 same. We have $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N = \bar{x} > \theta$ when $s > \theta$, in which case we also have $x_i = z_i = s > \bar{x}$
 699 for all non-experts. Vice versa is true for $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{x}_N < \theta$, where all non-expert predictions
 700 and meta-predictions are smaller than \bar{x} . Non-expert reports do not have any effect on the
 701 comparison between p_z and p_z because their predictions and meta-predictions are on the
 702 same side according to both measures. The proof of Theorem 3 applies for experts, namely

703 agents $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, K\}$. Since non-experts have no effect on the comparison between p_z
 704 and p_x , Theorem 3 applies. Finally, consider Theorem 4. For all non-experts, we have
 705 $z_i = s > \bar{x}$ if $s > \theta$ and $z_i = s \leq \bar{x}$ otherwise. Regardless of whether non-experts overshoot
 706 or undershoot in meta-predictions, $Q(1 - p_z)$ picks the highest prediction x_i that satisfies
 707 $x_i \leq \theta$. Only the exact quantile changes. Thus, Theorem 4 applies as well.

708 **C Dispersion of predictions in different data sets**




Figure C1: Inter-quartile range of predictions across the items in each data set. All predictions are scaled to 0-100%

D Bootstrap confidence intervals

C.Size	Comparison	Low.B.	Upp.B.	C.Size	Comparison	Low.B.	Upp.B.
10	Simp.Average	-0.28	0.19	60	Simp.Average	0.16	0.42
10	Median	-0.21	0.25	60	Median	0.27	0.55
10	Min.Pivot	-0.35	0.08	60	Min.Pivot	-0.07	0.16
10	Know.Weight	-0.28	0.17	60	Know.Weight	-0.11	0.29
10	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.22	0.25	60	Meta.Prob.Weight	0.10	0.38
20	Simp.Average	-0.04	0.32	70	Simp.Average	0.18	0.44
20	Median	0.03	0.43	70	Median	0.28	0.55
20	Min.Pivot	-0.18	0.13	70	Min.Pivot	-0.06	0.18
20	Know.Weight	-0.14	0.25	70	Know.Weight	-0.12	0.29
20	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.06	0.36	70	Meta.Prob.Weight	0.11	0.40
30	Simp.Average	0.04	0.38	80	Simp.Average	0.18	0.44
30	Median	0.14	0.49	80	Median	0.29	0.57
30	Min.Pivot	-0.15	0.17	80	Min.Pivot	-0.06	0.17
30	Know.Weight	-0.14	0.28	80	Know.Weight	-0.10	0.31
30	Meta.Prob.Weight	0.00	0.39	80	Meta.Prob.Weight	0.11	0.40
40	Simp.Average	0.09	0.40	90	Simp.Average	0.21	0.45
40	Median	0.20	0.51	90	Median	0.32	0.57
40	Min.Pivot	-0.11	0.16	90	Min.Pivot	-0.04	0.18
40	Know.Weight	-0.13	0.28	90	Know.Weight	-0.11	0.29
40	Meta.Prob.Weight	0.03	0.40	90	Meta.Prob.Weight	0.12	0.41
50	Simp.Average	0.14	0.42	100	Simp.Average	0.22	0.44
50	Median	0.24	0.53	100	Median	0.32	0.56
50	Min.Pivot	-0.08	0.17	100	Min.Pivot	-0.04	0.16
50	Know.Weight	-0.11	0.31	100	Know.Weight	-0.10	0.28
50	Meta.Prob.Weight	0.08	0.40	100	Meta.Prob.Weight	0.14	0.40

Table D1: 95% Bootstrap confidence intervals depicted in Figure 6b (Coin Flips data)

C.Size	Comparison	Low.B.	Upp.B.	C.Size	Comparison	Low.B.	Upp.B.
10	Simp.Average	0.73	2.65	50	Simp.Average	2.70	3.55
10	Median	1.14	3.33	50	Median	2.78	3.86
10	Min.Pivot	-0.76	0.88	50	Min.Pivot	0.51	1.22
10	Know.Weight	-0.86	0.75	50	Know.Weight	-0.25	0.46
10	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.76	1.29	50	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.23	0.71
20	Simp.Average	2.02	3.31	60	Simp.Average	2.85	3.68
20	Median	2.28	3.83	60	Median	2.92	3.91
20	Min.Pivot	0.11	1.19	60	Min.Pivot	0.60	1.30
20	Know.Weight	-0.33	0.79	60	Know.Weight	-0.20	0.48
20	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.28	1.15	60	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.15	0.67
30	Simp.Average	2.38	3.44	70	Simp.Average	2.87	3.59
30	Median	2.53	3.82	70	Median	2.92	3.81
30	Min.Pivot	0.30	1.18	70	Min.Pivot	0.61	1.24
30	Know.Weight	-0.31	0.55	70	Know.Weight	-0.23	0.42
30	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.37	0.84	70	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.23	0.61
40	Simp.Average	2.66	3.61	80	Simp.Average	2.94	3.68
40	Median	2.76	3.96	80	Median	2.97	3.88
40	Min.Pivot	0.51	1.28	80	Min.Pivot	0.67	1.31
40	Know.Weight	-0.18	0.60	80	Know.Weight	-0.16	0.44
40	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.21	0.83	80	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.15	0.67

Table D2: 95% Bootstrap confidence intervals depicted in Figure 7, General Knowledge data

C.Size	Comparison	Low.B.	Upp.B.	C.Size	Comparison	Low.B.	Upp.B.
10	Simp.Average	2.87	10.58	50	Simp.Average	8.57	11.98
10	Median	5.05	14.40	50	Median	10.10	15.09
10	Min.Pivot	-1.44	4.73	50	Min.Pivot	2.34	5.20
10	Know.Weight	-2.10	4.91	50	Know.Weight	-1.65	2.26
10	Meta.Prob.Weight	-4.38	2.86	50	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.88	2.43
20	Simp.Average	6.25	11.46	60	Simp.Average	8.90	11.89
20	Median	8.14	14.95	60	Median	10.43	14.88
20	Min.Pivot	1.01	4.99	60	Min.Pivot	2.62	5.14
20	Know.Weight	-1.47	3.92	60	Know.Weight	-1.70	2.11
20	Meta.Prob.Weight	-2.30	2.55	60	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.73	2.32
30	Simp.Average	7.42	11.51	70	Simp.Average	9.09	11.88
30	Median	9.09	14.79	70	Median	10.59	14.69
30	Min.Pivot	1.43	4.81	70	Min.Pivot	2.73	4.99
30	Know.Weight	-1.79	2.89	70	Know.Weight	-1.66	1.68
30	Meta.Prob.Weight	-1.75	2.26	70	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.56	2.20
40	Simp.Average	8.38	11.93	80	Simp.Average	9.24	11.93
40	Median	9.83	15.25	80	Median	10.81	14.81
40	Min.Pivot	2.34	5.20	80	Min.Pivot	2.94	5.11
40	Know.Weight	-1.48	3.02	80	Know.Weight	-1.65	1.59
40	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.83	2.57	80	Meta.Prob.Weight	-0.39	2.20

Table D3: 95% Bootstrap confidence intervals depicted in Figure 7, State Capital data

Comparison	Dispersion	Low.B.	Upp.B.
Simp.Average	Low	0.59	1.19
Median	Low	-0.45	0.12
Min.Pivot	Low	-0.30	0.32
Know.Weight	Low	-0.69	0.13
Meta.Prob.Weight	Low	1.29	2.79
Simp.Average	Medium	2.41	3.37
Median	Medium	2.32	3.74
Min.Pivot	Medium	0.47	1.11
Know.Weight	Medium	-0.37	0.24
Meta.Prob.Weight	Medium	-0.75	0.68
Simp.Average	High	10.93	14.01
Median	High	9.85	16.31
Min.Pivot	High	4.76	7.09
Know.Weight	High	2.84	4.71
Meta.Prob.Weight	High	-0.26	2.26


Table D4: 95% Bootstrap confidence intervals depicted in Figure 8, General Knowledge data

Comparison	Dispersion	Low.B.	Upp.B.
‘Simp.Average	Low	1.52	2.75
Median	Low	-1.05	0.05
Min.Pivot	Low	0.87	1.54
Know.Weight	Low	-0.07	0.84
Meta.Prob.Weight	Low	5.34	7.31
Simp.Average	Medium	6.62	12.21
Median	Medium	7.54	17.11
Min.Pivot	Medium	0.97	4.31
Know.Weight	Medium	-4.88	-2.19
Meta.Prob.Weight	Medium	-6.29	-0.81
Simp.Average	High	20.07	24.56
Median	High	21.40	32.02
Min.Pivot	High	7.56	11.71
Know.Weight	High	0.52	3.27
Meta.Prob.Weight	High	2.27	4.24

Table D5: 95% Bootstrap confidence intervals depicted in Figure 8, State Capital data

710 **E Analysis on the Coin Flips data - Nested structure**

(a) Average RMSE vs (bootstrap) crowd size



(b) Reduction in log absolute error (averaged across items) in Bootstrap samples





Figure E1: Bootstrap analysis on Coin Flips data

711 Figure E1 presents the results of a bootstrap analysis (described in Section 5.1) on the
 712 Nested structure data. As discussed in Section 4.1, the Nested structure differs from the

713 formal framework of the SO algorithm. Nevertheless, the SO algorithm does not perform
 714 significantly worse than any of the benchmarks considered.

715 **F SO algorithm with interpolated quantile function**

(a) Average RMSE (across iterations) vs crowd size



(b) Reduction in log absolute error (averaged across items) in Bootstrap samples




Figure F1: Results of bootstrap analysis on Coin Flips data




Figure F2: Pairwise differences in Bootstrapped Transformed Brier scores.

716 G Robustness checks on Section 5.2




Figure G1: Bootstrap differences in Transformed Brier Scores (measure of dispersion: kurtosis)




Figure G2: Bootstrap differences in Transformed Brier Scores (equal split in categories of dispersion)

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